CHRISTOPHER HUGHES GLOBALISATION AND NATIONALISM: SQUARING THE CIRCLE IN CHINESE IR THEORY
As the end of the Cold War has led debates in International Relations towards understanding processes of globalization, issues of culture and identity have increasingly come to challenge the state-centred concerns of what was a largely realist agenda. In part this has been caused by a number of boldly provocative works that appeared during the flourishing of liberal-democratic triumphalism that accompanied the collapse of the Soviet Union.
1 Although the vision of globalization as the spread of liberal-democracy has since been subjected to vigorous criticism, the resul has been a more refined understanding and theorising of some of the previous assumptions about the way in which globalization takes place. In part this has led to a polarisation between those who continue to see globalization as a more or less one-way spread of liberal-democracy via global markets on the one side, and those who see that the continuing presence of phenomena such as nationalism and civilizational loyalties means that we need to question whether globalization either is, or should be, taking place at all.
Within the context of this debate, China presents a particularly interesting case. On the one hand it can be pointed out that `by most measures of trade and investment China is remarkably integrated in the global economic system and steadily becoming more interdependent'. 2 On the other hand, however, China is held by some foreign observers to be the centre of a civilization that could rival `the West' in the struggle for world dominance, and a state that presents the most likely threat to international security and US hegemony in the Asia-Pacific. 3 What is most interesting, though, is that while this debate has been raging outside China, it has been paralleled within China itself by a growing literature on themes directly related to processes of interdependence, globalization, national identity and the rise of nationalism. Much can be learnt from a survey of such work. What will be explored below is what it can tell us about the seemingly paradoxical relationship between globalization and nationalism.
GLOBALISATION AND NATIONALISM IN CHINA
A convenient definition of `globalization' is given by Malcolm Waters, who sums it up as: `A social process in which the constraints 1 of geography on social and cultural arrangements recede and in which people become increasingly aware that they are receding'. 4 There is a range of opinions concerning when this process began, ranging from the Age of Discovery to the post-War period. 5 What seems hard to deny, though, is that since the end of the 1960s phenomena such as space exploration, environmental problems and the information technology revolution, accompanied by international rights discourses and trans-national identities based on sexual preference, gender, ethnicity and race have led to an `acceleration' of this process. What is not so clear, though, is whether the processes of space and time compression that are being brought about are leading to the decline of the states system or the development of a homogeneous or heterogeneous global culture. While evidence of the spread of commercial culture, the Coca Colonisation of the world and `waves' of democratisation seems to indicate the spread of some kind of uniformity, events such as the wars in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda indicate what a number of writers on globalization have pointed out, that it can actually lead to the resurgence and strengthening of local identities. 6 These points can be illustrated quite clearly by the case of China.
Here we can go back as far as the Jesuit missionaries to see some signs of European cultural influence, although this was largely negative. 7 Since the defeat of the Qing dynasty by Britain in the Opium War, though, we can see an increasingly radical acceptance of the need to understand the power of modern technology. However, rather than mere acceptance of all things `Western' this has always learning has always been seen as instrumental to the preservation of what is `Chinese'. As the Confucian reformers put it, foreign `function' (yong) could be taken in order to preserve Chinese `essence' (ti). 8 This theme has remained central to Chinese politics in the twentieth century, whether it be in the attempt to reconstruct Chinese tradition by the Nationalists after the 1911 revolution 9 , or in the shape of Mao's `sinification' of Marxism. 10 Closer to the present, the more integrated China has become into the global economy under Deng Xiaoping's policy of `opening and reform', the more pronounced has become this dialectical relationship between learning from the outside in order to preserve China's uniqueness and autonomy. It is a position encapsulated in a speech made by Deng in September 1982, in which he told the Twelfth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) that while it is necessary to learn from outside, this does not mean allowing China to become subordinate to any foreign power, `rotten thinking' from abroad and the spread of a bourgeois life-style.
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That this position remains relevant in the late 1990s is indicated by the fact that the above speech is actually the first chapter in the third volume of The Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, published in October 1993 as a final attempt to lay down the ideological cannon for Deng's successor. The speeches that follow thus encapsulate the wisdom of the patriarch distilled from his handling of the domestic political crisis of 1989, the collapse of Communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and the end of the Cold War. Throughout this the central message is that `reform and opening' is justified not only in terms of raising the standard of living, but because it will enable nationalist ideals to be achieved, such as laying the foundation for China to be united with Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao, and providing the power to oppose international `hegemonism'.
The resulting theory is ingenious insofar as it turns the globalization of liberalism thesis on its head by proposing that globalisation can actually exist in a virtuous relationship with nationalism and party dictatorship. Simply put, global integration is necessary if China is to grow strong, but the dictatorship of the CCP is needed if this is not to lead to China losing its identity and independence in the process. Within this scenario, the art of politics becomes that of striking the right balance between globalization and nationalism in the context of rapidly fluctuating foreign and domestic pressures. We thus see that while the international situation is relatively stable there can be a degree of flexibility over nationalistic issues for the sake of achieiving the kind of peaceful environment conducive to economic growth. This is even true for the ultra-sensitive issue of territorial sovereignty, as can be seen when Deng tells a delegation of Indian social scientists in 1982 that border disputes can be resolved when the two contending sides make concessions, 12 An even more radical departure on this theme is made two years later when he goes so far as to advocate that the formula of `one country, two systems', first developed to bring about unification with Hong Kong and Taiwan, might also be useful for resolving disputes in other parts of the world because it allows questions of sovereignty to be `put aside' while territories are jointly developed.
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Such strategic flexibility, however, can never be allowed to take priority over the nationalism upon which the CCP stakes its legitimacy in domestic politics. This is something that Deng makes quite clear when he tells Margaret Thatcher in September 1982 that any Chinese leader who fails to bring about unification with Hong Kong will have to step down.
14 For Deng, to compromise on this issue of national unification would imply that China has not actually achieved the independence, 15 perhaps the proudest prize claimed by the CCP in its long and costly history. After all, the tragedies of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution begin to fade when presented within the meta-narrative of China's stand against imperialism. Any leader who allowed foreign powers to interfere in domestic concerns, or accepted the transformation of China in a Western mould, would not find a favourable place in this story.
In fact, no matter how much Deng is bent on seeking national wealth and power, he can never ignore the nationalism of this political culture. This can be seen in the way in which liberal notions of human rights are rejected because they place the interests of individuals or minorities above the rights of the state. 16 It can be seen even more dramatically in Deng's approval of the campaigns against `spiritual pollution' and `bourgeois liberalisation', mobilised by critics of the speed of his reforms who drew support from the popular resentment felt towards the conspicuous consumption of individuals who could suddenly afford consumer goods. 17 For Deng, succumbing to foreign cultural influences would not only pose a threat to unification with Taiwan, it would even risk the unity of the Chinese mainland itself.
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If this `pollution' is not eradicated at an early stage, he insists, not only will it lead 13 Deng Xiaoping, `Wending shijie jushi de xin banfa' (`A New Method for Stabilising the World Situation'), SW3, pp. 49-50.
14 Deng Xiaoping, `Women dui Xianggang wenti de jiben lichang', (`Our Basic Position on the Hong Kong Problem'), SW3, pp. 12-13. 15 It is not surprising that the domestic and international challenges to Chinese Communism after 1989 should have led Deng to an increasingly pessimistic view of the world. What is most significant, though, is that rather than this weakening the dynamics of his ideology, it seems to actually strengthen the nationalism-globalisation nexus upon which it is premised. Looking outwards, he thus concludes that the post-Cold War era will be characterised by small wars, with the developed states encouraging conflict between the developing and continuing to bully them. The Cold War will be replaced by two new cold wars: one between North and South and the other the war against socialism. 21 He warns the West that if they continue with a policy of forcing China to adopt their model of democracy, civil war war and a refugee crisis for the Asia-Pacific will be a result. Moreover, China will not stand alone because the Islamic and African countries will not be able to copy the Western model of democracy either. 22 As Deng reminds a visiting Richard Nixon, if chaos is to be avoided, international politics must be conducted according to the pursuit of national interests while refraining from interfering in the internal affairs of other states. 23 Yet it is this challenge that allows him to argue for stronger leadership, including an insistence that China cannot afford to appear soft on the international stage when under threat, and that any leader who compromises under foreign pressure will loose popular support and will eventually lose power. 24 The result is a pure realism, the vision of international politics taking place in a multipolar world order, in which China is one of the great powers. 25 The neo-liberal vision that China can be transformed through market mechanisms is rejected as a policy of `peaceful evolution' that is no more than a euphemism for a conspiracy to bring about chaos in the socialist states.
26
Looking inwards, if Deng thus sees that the world after 1989 will require a stronger state, he can argue that if reform and opening is to lead to strength and not weakness, then the human rights that the liberal-democracies wish to foist on China must take second place to `state rights'. 27 After all, this makes good sense when presented in terms of the anti-imperialist meta-narrative, as Deng does when he reminds Party members following student protests in December 1986 that before the CCP came to power China under the bullying of imperialism used to be described as `a plate of loose sand', 28 recalling a metaphor coined by the `National Father' Sun Yatsen in 1924, 29 and used previously by Deng himself after the suppression of the Beijing Spring of 1979.
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Although the threats to China's integrity posed by an unfriendly world after 1989 can be used to legitimise the CCP dictatorship, however, as before this is never allowed to smother the necessity for opening and reform. Now this can be presented as the only way for China to avoid the fate of the Soviet Union, 31 and by 1991 Deng can already conclude that stability has been achieved in China and that it will not be enough by itself to solve all the country's problems. 32 It is at this point, that he emerges from retirement and embarks on his `Southern Tour' to make his clearest statement of all against anti-foreign retrenchment going too far. 33 It is significant that it is the speeches Deng made during this key event that are summarised in the last chapter of the Selected Works. It is here that Deng calls his policy of balancing the tension between reform and opening on the one hand, and the maintenance of Chinese essence and independence on the other, as `grabbing with two hands', with `one hand grabbing reform and opening, one hand suppressing all kinds of criminal activities'. As Deng sums it up, `So long as our productive strength develops, a certain rate of economic growth is maintained, and grabbing with two hands is maintained, then the building of a socialist spiritual civilisation can be accomplished '. 34 Sandwiched between the forces of radical reform and conservatism and torn between economic growth and political crisis, then, we see in Dengism an attempt to reach a compromise that can be called neither `conservative' nor `Westernising'. Instead, it depends on the development of a compromise that makes sense in terms of the goal of building and preserving a Chinese `spiritual civlization'. The result is an ideology that legimitates an authoritarian state presiding over a market economy, leaving Deng's China looking more towards Lee Kuan-yew's Singapore than towards Marx or Mao. 35 As with Lee Kuan-yew's version of `Asian values', the result is what the sociologist Jan Nederveen Pieterse might call a `hybrid' concept.
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That is to say, by freely combining themes and concepts of modernity and tradition, the idea of a `spiritual civilization' can be represented as something that is both Chinese and modern, patriotic and internationalist. 37 In short, it provides a political discourse that squares globalization with nationalism.
THE CLASH OF CIVILISATIONS?
32 Deng Xiaoping, `Zongjie jingyan, shiyong rencai' (`Sum Up Experience, Use Personnel'), SW3, pp. 368-9. 33 Deng Xiaoping, `Zai Wuhan, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shanghai deng di de tanhua yaodian' (`Essential Points of Talk in Wuhan, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shangai Areas'), SW3, pp. 370-83. 34 Ibid. p. 379. Dengism also has a wider impact, in that it defines the parameters within which the academic discourse on globalization in China takes place. This can be illustrated quite well if we look at how the academic community has responded to the challenges of the end of the Cold War. According to Chen Lemin, a researcher at the European Research Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, during the period of reform under Deng Xiaoping researchers exposed to foreign thinking had already begun to move away from seeing international relations in terms of `fronts' and `camps' and towards catching up with the world trend of combining political and economic concerns in research. A further expansion of the field towards linking international problems with world history took place with the 500th anniversary of Columbus's landing in the Americas. It was as this broadening out of the field was occurring that scholars in China began to read about Huntington's theory on the clash of civilisations.
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Huntington's idea that China is at the heart of a Confucian civilization that will come into increasing conflict with the West poses a difficult problem for Chinese scholars working on the Dengist paradigm. Some, of course, can fall back on a historical-materialist position of the Marxist tradition, writing off conflict between civilisations as merely the manifestation of competing economic interests. 40 Yet there are others who realise that Huntington is laying down an agenda that they will have to meet. This can be done in part by finding some things in Huntington with which they can agree, such as the view that the conflicts of the past few centuries belong to a period of `Western civil wars' which have been followed by a period of confrontation between the West and the rest. 41 More significant, though, is that some scholars actually express a note of gratitude to Huntington for shaking them out of their pre-occupation with nations, states and economics, even if the particular cultural-political situation in China has made his work highly provocative. This is an important admission when it comes from a writer as influential as Wang Jisi of the American Research Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, who has been heavily influenced both by the `English School' and American realism since visiting Oxford in 1982. 42 Wang is now sceptical about whether events such as the Cultural Revolution and international conflicts can really be explained in terms of economics, and he acknowledges the complexity of the relationship between values and spiritual belief on the one side, and nation-state identity, material interests and conflicts over resources on the other. He even goes so far as to concede that recent US tensions with East Asia do seem to indicate that Huntington may not be entirely wrong. 43 Wang even goes so far as to say that one of the problems with Huntington is not that he privileges culture, but that he under-estimates its significance during the Cold War. 44 Yet if some of Huntington's Chinese critics are prepared to try to save the Dengist paradigm by accepting that culture is important in international politics, they have to differ with his conclusion that transactions between civilizations must lead to conflict. This, after all, is seen as a kind of neo-Cold War thinking that grows from American paranoia and which threatens Chinese security, especially when Huntington concludes that a Confucian Chinese civilisation will align itself with the Islamic world to confront `the West'. 45 One way to achieve this is to point to the broader tendency for different civilizations to `co-exist' and engage in `exchange' or `integration' at different levels. Although contact 41 Wang Yizhou, `Guoji zhengzhi de you yi zhong toushi' (`Another Perspective on International Politics'), Civilisation, pp. 57-70.
42 Wang Jisi, `"Wenming chongtu lun" lun zhan pingshu' (`An Assessment of the Debate Over the "Clash of Civilizations Theory"'), Civilisation, pp. 18-56. `Wenming chongtu lun de lilun jichu yu xianshi yiyi' (`The Theoretical Foundation and Realist Significance of the Theory of the Clash of Civilisations'), Civilisation, pp. 178-211. 43 Ibid., pp. 23-34. 44 Op. cit., in note 38, pp 187-90. 45 XU GUOQI: AMERICA'S PSYCHO-CULTURAL COMPLEX AND THE THEORY OF THE CLASH OF CIVILISATIONS, pp. 281-300. FENG TIANYU: ANALYSIS OF THE "THEORY OF THE DETERMINISM OF THE CLASH OF CIVILISATIONS." can lead to conflict, within that conflict there can still be an element of integration. According to this view, `de-construction' is merely the forerunner of `amalgamation'. 46 Interestingly enough, Chinese writers can point to their own history to illustrate this point, arguing that China has absorbed Indian culture and that the complex heterogeneity of Confucianism shows how conflict between civilisations tends to be merely a temporary step on the way to absorption. 47 This argument can even be extended to relations with the West, as is shown by drawing attention to China's nineteenth-century learning about Western technology, through the nationalist May 4 movement of 1919 with its calls to learn from `Mr Science' and `Mr Democracy', down to the present-day policy of opening and reforming. From this perspective, the problem of relations between civlizations is not one of Chinese being unwilling to learn from outside, but of the West not being prepared to let them do so. What opposition to the West does arise is not due to anti-Westernism per se, but to the promotion by Western states of values such as human rights for the sake of pursuing their own national interests. 48 Perhaps such writers are in fact doing us a favour be drawing attention to the dangers of taking a too Eurocentric view of globalization when they point out that it can hardly be seen as a new problem when the Chinese have in fact been struggling with the relationship between their own culture and modernity for over a hundred years. 49 A writer like Huntington also seems to be entirely un-aware of the debates that rage in the Chinese-reading world over what Confucianism is, whether it is China's mainstream culture, whether that culture is in a period of revival or decline, and whether it is amalgamating or diverging with western culture. This debate has in fact been so intense that many Chinese have come to the stage where they feel that their own culture may now have no foundations at all. If this is so, can one really speak of a `clash of civilisations'? 50 Might it be better in fact to see civilisations 46 Zhu Wenli, `Essentials of Huntington's Theory of the Clash of Civilisations', Civilisation, pp. 6-8. 47 Tang Yijie, `Ping Hengtingdun de "wenming de chongtu?"' (`A Critique of Huntington's "The Clash of Civilizations?"'), Civilization, pp. 251-2. 48 Shi Zhong, `Weilai de chongtu' (`Future Conflict'), Civilisation, pp. 135-6, 142. Ni Shixiong, `Wo suo liaojie de "wenming chongtu lun"' (`The "Clash of Civilisations" as I Understand It'), Civilisation, p. 390. Kuang Yang, `Biandong zhong de shijie tujing' (`The Changing World Scene'), Civilisation, p. 244. Tang Yijie, op. cit., note 42, p. 253. Feng Tianyu, `"Wenming chongtu jueding lun" bianxi' (`Refutation of the "Theory of the Determinism of Civilisational Conflict"'), Civilisation, p. 306. 49 Wang Jisi, op. cit. in note 38, p. 33. 50 Zhang Rulun, `Wenhua de chongtu haishi wenhua kunjing' from a longer historical perspective, not as hard units that come into conflict, but as cultures whose apparent clashes really conceal a process of integration.
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From the perspective of Chinese security, there are obvious benefits in seeing cultural transactions as leading to integration rather than conflict. This can lead to a remarkably positive vision of globalization, in which states are reduced to local governments, resulting in smaller and smaller conflicts between ever smaller units. In this view, the most important task after the Cold War is to contain large conflicts that might still still occur in the period of transition, thus giving globalisation a chance. 52 Rather than conflict then, the result of globalization will be a world civilization as envisioned by Confucius, Plato, Kant and Marx 53 and determined by the fact that humanity is facing common problems in the shape of modernity.
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BACK TO THE NATIONALIST CIRCLE If Chinese authors end up arguing in favour of a world civilisation so as to rebut Huntington's pessimism, however, this leaves them on the horns of the old dilemma of just how much Chinese `essence' they are really prepared to give up. As Feng Tianyu, a professor at Wuhan University puts it, can one be both a world citizen and Chinese? 55 As we have seen, in Deng Xiaoping this circle is squared through seeing interdependence as providing the necessary state power to prevent external threats to Chinese security and `un-desirable' domestic cultural developments while the nation is building its own `spiritual civilisation' under the leadership of the CCP. Chinese critics of Huntington cannot go too far beyond this paradigm, but they can articulate it in a way that will allow for a more sophisticated explanation of how globalization can lead to both plurality and universality within a world civilisation.
One way to do this is to accept that there are indeed many civilisations in the world, each with its own particular rules of (`Cultural Conflict or Cultural Difficulty?'), Civilisation, pp. 317-8. 56 Universality, on the other hand, can be explained because all of these civilisations have to tackle the problems of a universal modernity. That is to say, any friction that emerges in the process of cultural transformation is not due to conflict between the West and the rest, but between tradition and modernity. 57 
the possibility of taking this diversity as a starting point for constructing a pluralistic culture in the West is seen as potentially a good thing from a Chinese perspective. If China does need to learn anything from the West, it is exactly this, that `culture' is the means to prevent the uniformity of modernity.
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If the authors look to a variety of `idealist' thinkers from East and West to inspire their vision of a world civilisation, it is perhaps inevitable that they should look to Weber and Habermas to reject the necessity that such a civilisation must be established by a monolithic modernity. This is because when Weber and Habermas recover the human face of reason in the form of `purposive rationality' and `value rationality' from the cold `instrumental rationality' of the modern world 61 they provide a dichotomy that can fulfil the purposes of the old `essence-function' dichotomy in Chinese thinking about modernity. If it can be agreed that aspects of society such as religion, philosophy, literature, art, social psychology and customs can stand autonomous from `instrumental 56 62 After all, Weber himself pointed out that while Protestant rationality is able to dominate the world, `Confucian rationality' is compatible with the world. If East Asia can now be said to be standing between Protestant and Confucian rationality, the possibility arises of a type of `neo-rationalism' in which the individual is seen in the holistic terms of his or her relations with society and nature. 63 Harking back again to that other possibility of an Asian version of modernity found in Singapore's Lee Kuan-yew, 64 an argument thus emerges for Asians to develop their own solutions to the problems of modernity which will lead the region into the `Asian century '. 65 This march towards the Asian century is said to be taking place as the impact of the West and global markets has broken the tradition of paternalism in the family and in authoritarian government, without putting unbridled individualism in their place. Instead, there is said to be a new communitarianism based on preserving family emotions, only without the paternal head. Moreover, although the spirit of conquering nature and of progress has taken root, limitations imposed by the lack of resources and environmental degradation are leading to the phenomena of neo-environmentalism and neo-conservatism. By the former is meant advocacy of the conservation of nature, by the latter is meant promotion of harmony, balance, stability and progress through compromise rather than competition.
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DEVELOPING CHINA'S OWN IDENTITY As with Deng Xiaoping, then, the authors maintain a vision of civilisation in which the unique `spiritual' aspects of Chinese (or perhaps `Asian') culture can be separated from `functional' aspects such as economics and government. 67 It is this that enables the writers to deny that intercourse between civilisations will entail a loss of China's cultural or political independence. In fact, somewhat ironically perhaps, the vision of international politics emerges from Chinese critiques of Huntington remains that of the states system, with Wang Jisi openly advocating the `anarchical society'. 68 As Wang indicates, this is in full conformity with the official `patriotic education outline' issued under Jiang Zemin's auspices, according to which patriotism means the desire to develop the achievements of the Chinese nation while studying and absorbing the achievements of every country's civilisation. 69 This is not to say that Chinese writers on Huntington are un-aware of the potential threat to sovereignty posed by cultural influences. Wang Huning, Professor of International Politics at Shanghai's Fudan University, explores the issue of `cultural hegemony' in most depth and comes up with an argument in favour of protecting `cultural sovereignty'. 70 This is important for all states if political stability is to be maintained in the face of threats posed by states promoting their own values for political ends, and by sub-state groups whose demands for what Mayall calls `cultural authenticity' develop into calls for political sovereignty. 71 Following through this argument, Wang makes one of the book's few direct references to Deng Xiaoping, when he advocates Deng's giving priority to `state rights' over `human rights' in the field of politics.
72
Having said this, Wang Huning is also aware that the development of international society has meant that sovereignty has inevitably been limited by numerous factors. These include incongruity between nation and state, weak government, psychological factors, international intervention, the hardening of international law, the growth of international organisations and non-governmental power, economic interdependence, and deepening global crises. 73 Yet this weakening of sovereignty is all the more reason why the desirability of a pluralistic world culture should be accepted. And this means accepting the legitimacy of state measures to protect cultural sovereignty. While Wang here refers to measures such as those used by France as insulation from Hollywood, in the Chinese context this presumably prefers to the mass campaigns of the Deng era.
The metaphor of a liberal `international society' within which the private sphere of states reigns supreme is thus extended to embrace a possible totalitarianism in domestic politics. 74 Wang Huning does this in some detail as he explains that the fundamental principle of cultural sovereignty should be that if a state uses its power in a way that is seen to be legal by others, its aspirations are less likely to be constrained. If a state's culture and ideology are attractive, then others will naturally be drawn by their own accord. If a state can establish a domestic system in conformity with the international system, it will have no need to change itself. If a state can sufficiently support an international system, other states will be willing to use this system to moderate their activities. There will thus be no need to pay the high price of using `hard' power.
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Whereas Deng took the opportunity of his meeting with Richard Nixon to confirm a state-centred model of international politics, for at least one critic of Huntington it is Henry Kissinger's vision of a multi-polar post-Cold War order stabilised by a balance of power that is most desirable. It need not follow that complex interdependence between states will erode this. On the contrary, it will mitigate against the formation of ideological blocs, encourage regional cooperation, and leave more room for compromise. It is within this scenario that China can feel secure in its policy of developing a `socialist market economy' which promotes globalisation and supersedes civilisational boundaries in order to protect its national interests and increase its state power to face future challenges. civilisations. 77 As in Deng Xiaoping, the ideological conflict of the Cold War will be replaced by the North-South divide. 78 In such a situation, because non-Western countries can no longer look to the Soviet Union as a balance against the West, their independence might indeed best be ensured by combining forces as advocated by Southeast Asian leaders.
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To prevent Huntington's views becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy, a wider definition of politics is thus required. This includes working by building on double-win situations and through realising that each state's security depends on international security as a whole. Peace should be promoted through mutual contacts and the absence of permanent military alliances, a reduction in military spending, relaxation of border disputes and preventing the rise of extreme nationalism. This does not mean, however, that nationalism should be rejected altogether or become devoid of all significant content. It is seen to be a `double-edged sword' that can both consolidate national spirit and produce very negative results.
CAN CHINA SAY NO?
If the works collected together in Civilisation represent the thinking of some of China's elite academic institutions, The China That Can Say No does not pretend to aspire to such a status. Written by five authors aged around thirty, including reporters, teachers, poets and freelance writers, it claims to be a reflection of broad public opinion. 81 Just how broad is hard to say, but some clues can be gained from the fact that the book became a best seller throughout the Chinese reading world and rapidly went into a second edition. It certainly seems to have struck a chord in broad circles not confined to mainland China, but stretching to Taiwan, Hong Kong and even the world's Chinatowns.
Another difference between Civilisation and The China That Can Say
No is in the timing of publication. Because the journal articles collected in the former were originally published in 1994, and the volume itself was published in December 1995, the authors could not have been influenced by the crisis in the Taiwan Strait between June 1995 and March 1996, which saw the largest US naval force in 77 It is in this context of China's military stand-off with the United States that the enthusiasm with which this book has been received can be explained, as can its emotive-populist style, which is. It is somewhat ironic, perhaps, that the marketisation of China's publishing industry could only have encouraged the writers to concern themselves so much with crude invective against the United States, Britain and Japan. Americans are condemned as ignoramuses living in a country that somehow manages to be both immature and degenerate. Japan is portrayed as a naive child under American occupation. The British are represented by a chapter portraying a debauched Oxford graduate whose main occupation is the ruthless exploitation of women in Thailand and mainland China.
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Within the barrage of insults, however, it is possible to gain some insights into how the authors see international politics. First of all, the authors are in full conformity with the other works looked at above when they single out the United States for criticism as part of their rejection of a post-Cold War order maintained by American hegemony. Again, it is the anarchical society of states that offers the best system for maintaining equality between states. As the Foreword concisely sums it up in a three-line aphorism:
The US cannot lead anybody, it can only lead itself. Japan cannot lead anybody, sometimes not even itself. China does not want to lead, it only wants to lead itself.
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If the book is also read as addressing the balance between nationalism and global integration looked at above, it can be understood as a statement that the nationalist element in Chinese politics needs to be strengthened if China is to survive as an equal member of international society. From this perspective, it is wrong to see the book only as the latest in the series of works of Asian defiance that includes The Japan That Can Say No 84 and The Asia That Can Say No. 85 It can just as interestingly be read within a more established Chinese literary genre concerned with the crisis of identity that goes back to the Confucian reformers of the nineteenth century. It is when one sees The China That Can Say No in this context that it becomes evident that a kind of catharsis of the humiliation that China has suffered over the last 150 years is what is really taking place in this book. Rather than being concerned with rectifying the faults of foreigners, the authors are more concerned to make their Chinese readers question the admittedly absurd deification of all things Western that occurred during the last decade. Even the attack on `Mark' is in fact more of a criticism of those Chinese who choose to idolise him than of this product of the slumbering spires himself.
It is when The China That Can Say No is read as an indicator of how the Chinese see themselves that it becomes most informative concerning the present impact of globalisation on political culture. The most interesting part of the whole work in this respect is the opening section by Song Qiang.
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Here Song describes how his perceptions of the United States have changed from originally seeing the Americans as necessary allies against the Soviet Union in the 1970s, through deifying them in the 1980s, to bitter disappointment in the 1990s.
Just how heady the Sino-US love affair of the 1980s was is conveyed by anecdotes of student life when young people regretted that they did not have a leader like Ronald Reagan and felt that all enemies of the United States were enemies of China. Of course, the whole purpose of this reminiscing is to provide a contrast with the disillusionment that has followed. This has involved what the authors describe as their transformation from internationalism to nationalism due to injustices inflicted on their country by the international community. This process starts with attempts by the United States to prevent Beijing winning the bid for the 2000 Olympics, is followed by Washington's block on Beijing's application to join the World Trade Organization, America's abuse of human rights diplomacy to pursue its own interests and, of course, the US Navy's intervention in the Taiwan Strait. Much ink is also spilled over how the US has adopted a strategy of `containing China'.
The nationalist response to what is seen as a growing external threat to China gives an interesting insight into a complex tension that exists in all three of the books looked at here. This is the confusion between whether China is to be understood as a world power, on the one hand, or as fundamentally flawed in its lack of confidence and faith in itself on the other. As in Civilisation, the authors share a sense of optimism that the `Asian century' has arrived. Yet The China That Can Say No goes much further on this score and seems to hark back to the Maoist era when China was set to `overtake Britain and catch up with America'. The imagery now is that of China on a `motorbike' that will achieve in 40 years what took the industrialized states 120-150 years to do on their `bicycles'. If this Mao-type bravado and the bold rhetoric about saying `no' to the world indicates a confidence in China's status and ability, though, it also conceals a realisation that China is still only at the beginning of its possible climb to world power. What is particularly significant, for example, is that the authors see that China is not being held back in its ascent only by foreigners, but more importantly by the attitudes of the Chinese themselves. As Song Qiang puts it, before the Chinese can say `no' to America, they have to learn how to say `no' to themselves about slavishly following all things foreign. 89 The difficulty of the psychological jump from seeing foreigners as demi-gods to gaining the confidence to actually step out into the world and do your own thing is something that many of the authors are well aware of. As Tang Zhengyu points out, rather than self-confidence, what one is confronted by when walking through mainland China's streets is signs advertising `China's Long Island', and `The Manhattan of the East'. 90 To correct this situation, Tang argues, will require not only maintaining economic growth but also building a strong national consciousness for the Chinese nation.
That a sense of national consciousness is a well-spring of political power is something Chinese leaders have been well aware of at least since Sun Yat-sen described nationalism, in 1924, as `a kind of thought, a kind of faith, a kind of power ' . 91 Yet, it was in almost the same breath that he also acknowledged that China is a `plate of loose sand'. 92 If the authors of The China That Can Say No are now standing in the latest stage of the nation-building project that he began, do they have any new solutions? demands of interdependence, a glimmer of hope arises when Tang claims that `extreme nationalism' ought to be rejected by the Chinese. What could be useful for preserving Chinese essence is the kind of policy used by Canada and France to defend themselves against the hegemony of Hollywood. Tang thus approves of taxing American culture to provide funds to subsidize native arts and imposing quotas on the dissemination of American (and English) culture. 93 Yet if this is what Tang understands to be `moderate' nationalism, it is immediately called into question when he goes on to describe Chinese solidarity in terms of a parable about African ants who can only cross a river by rolling into a ball, sacrificing the individual for the survival of the colony. The old tension between nationalism and opening to the world thus appears to be irresolvable as Tang, like the other authors, fall back on the language of sacrificing the individual for the sake of national salvation.
A similar tension can be seen in the author who adopts the most open attitude towards modernity, Gu Qingsheng. For Gu, the Chinese must face up to the paradox that although they might belong to the oldest country in the world, the People's Republic of China is a very young republic. Recent fashions, such as the revival of Tang and Song dynasty modes of architecture, are indicative of a confusion between the old and the new which leads the Chinese to present themselves to the world as a museum piece rather than as a modern state based on a system of law and order. Rather than accept imprisonment by either their past or by a Saidian `post-colonial culture', a mixture of the best of all cultures available is what is required. Wearing a tie, banning smoking in public places, local elections and economic reforms are all as acceptable as going to a neighbour's house to learn how to make dumplings. The Chinese may have thrown away a lot of time due to the fact that they have `thought too much and produced ideas and so-called ideologies that they should not have had', but all they need to do now is to step out into the world with confidence.
94 Yet, as with Tang's colony of ants, the limits on Gu's understanding of moderation are revealed when he devotes a whole chapter to explaining why people should not fly in Boeing 777s. 95 Again, then, what we see is an author grappling with some of the fundamental issues that have bedeviled Chinese culture and politics ever since the impact of the West: Function versus essence, development versus independence, inter-dependence versus national pride. An optimistic reading of The China That Can Say No seems to reveal that the authors do feel a need to break away from such dichotomies. They always fail to do so, however, falling back instead on a nationalism characterised by xenophobia, sacrifice of the individual to the collective, and a faith in the panacea of economic 93 
CONCLUSION
The views looked at above provide an insight into the post-Cold War discourse on nationalism and globalisation in China from the perspectives of the state, academia and popular opinion. So how successful are these latest in a long line of attempts at squaring the circle that go back to the Confucian reformers of the nineteenth century?
It can certainly be said that the various arguments looked at are consistent with each other in so far as they share the following views. First of all, they all reject the inevitability and desirability of a monolithic rationality that will lead to a uniform global modernity modelled on `Western' values. Drawing on their own experience and a variety of outside sources, the various authors are able to conclude that this need not be the outcome of economic development. They are able to argue this by accepting the premise, shared by some recent European critics of globalisation, that culture and economics `belong to different domains '. 96 Secondly, all the authors see that the most desirable international system remains that of the anarchical society of sovereign states. This will allow the political security necessary for both the development of a uniquely Chinese civilization, and for China to participate in its unique way to the resolution of the global problems of modernity. Again, this mirrors the conclusion of some recent commentators outside China that the anarchical society remains `the most obvious depository for the natural diversity of human culture'. 97 Perhaps it can be said, then, that the writings looked at above provide some empirical insight into why the revival of nationalism in an age of globalism need not be seen as a paradox.
If this is the case, however, we are also provided with an opportunity to look into the real implications of the kind of security that is provided by a post-Cold War anarchical society of states. Certainly, in the case of China, the cultivation of nationalist sentiments has provided an important resource for defending the state against foreign incursion. As is shown by the campaigns against `spiritual pollution' of the 1980s to the more recent campaign against `colonial culture' launched in 1996 under Jiang Zemin, this translates into a very particular type of security for individuals. It may offer safety from the US Navy, but it does not offer safety from agents of the Chinese state preventing the use of 96 That the trade off between state security and individual security is often at the expense of the latter is not an unusual phenomenon in the world. As Barry Buzan points out, `State and nation offer symbols and identities which both attract individuals seeking expression and outlet for their insecurities, and reproduce the political conditions that are one of the major sources of personal insecurity'.
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Yet if nationalism is justified largely in so far as it provides security for the state, events in China seem to indicate that even this understanding of security needs to be questioned. For example, with the state having encouraged nationalist sentiments so heavily, it is hard to see how the military tension with the US Navy over the issue of elections in Taiwan could have been avoided without a serious loss of face to leaders in Beijing. As elections are to be frequently held in Taiwan in the future, the possibility of a dangerous spiral of tension between democratisation and Chinese nationalism appears hard to avoid.
More recently the danger of Chinese nationalism creating a security threat for the Chinese state has been seen in the dispute over the Senkaku (Diaoyutai) islands that are occupied by Japan and claimed by China. When a group of Japanese nationalists erected a lighthouse on the islands to assert the sovereignty of the Japanese state, this triggered off an explosion of nationalist fervour throughout the Chinese-reading world. Somewhat ironically, while mass patriotic movements came developed in Hong Kong and Taiwan in September 1996, Beijing felt it more prudent to keep a lid on student activities on its own campuses.
When the Diaoyutai movement came to a climax with the drowning of a Hong Kong journalist attempting to land on the islands, the event was only briefly mentioned on the mainland Chinese media and was not carried in the press. It was reported in newspapers in Taiwan and Hong Kong that Beijing had become so concerned about the development of a mass movement that a directive was issued to local authorities ordering them not to allow the cause to disrupt social stability, involve autonomous meetings and demonstrations or the dissemination of information, and to prevent it linking up with enemy powers.
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Such events seem to indicate that while Beijing sees the value in promoting nationalism as a form of legitimisation after the failure of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought, it may wish to do so 98 Martin Walker and Andrew Higgins, `Here Comes Mickey Mao', The Guardian (`The Week' section, November 30, 1996), p. 2. 99 Buzan, op. cit., note 92, p. 50. 100 Xin bao (Hong Kong, 27 September 1996), Lianhe bao (Taibei, 28 September 1996). selectively when the result is escalating tension with Japan or the United States. It may be true, therefore, that nationalism offers individuals in China the kind of security in an age of globalisation that Anthony Smith describes as the promise of `outfacing death and oblivion'. 101 The policy of `grabbing with two hands' may also succeed in providing domestic security for the CCP Party-state through a combination of economic growth and rising nationalist expectations. Yet this nationalism remains a `two edged' instrument for enhancing security in so far as it also poses both a threat to individual security, in terms of civil liberties, and also enhances tensions with neighbouring states. Whether or not the CCP can maintain the right balance between nationalism and globalisation thus presents an interesting case study for those wishing to explore the nature of security after the Cold War.
